The first World Ward isrupted the proposalt oh old an internationalc ongress of philosophy in England in 1915.W hen the philosophersg ot together again it was at a meeting in Oxford in 1920 jointly organized by the Mind Association, the Aristotelian Society and the British Psychological Society; invitations were extendedt od elegates from America and France. The roll call of luminaries was impressive: it included Bertrand Russell (who, in fact, failed to appear) HenriB ergson, James Ward, Sir James Frazier,F rederic Bartlett, HenryH ead,a nd even the philosopher-statesmen, A. J. Balfour and Lord Haldane (Hoernlé ,1921) .
laryngeal activity,t he topic of the paper reproduced here. The attentiong iven to his 1920 paper confirms the view that Watson'sproposals are not, in fact, as absurd as all that when theya re considered, not as isolated 'sound-bites', but in the contexto fh is thinking about psychology generally.W atson'sown paper,reprinted here, is an attempt to do that forh is notion of thinking. But before turning to adirect examination of this topic, it will be well to stand back and look at the bigger picture.
Watson was brought up with the introspectionist psychology of the early 20th century,a lbeit with the 'functionalist' versiono fh is mentor J. R. Angell (a devoted disciple of William James). This version was supportive of Watson'ss tudies of animal behaviour -o bservations of behaviour could be used to infer the nature of the animal'sconsciousness and the investigator could then demonstrate how the processes so inferred functioned in determining the behaviour of the animal. Watson quickly came to see the redundancy inherent in this programme, and argued that the study of behaviour was of merit in its own right, without the needf or speculation about the animal'sc onsciousness. His behaviourism canb es een as the extension of this argument to psychology generally.F or humans,a sf or nonhuman animals, psychology is seen as the study of behaviour,n ot of consciousness. Introspection should play no greater role fort he psychologist than it does foraphysicist who uses it merely to reportt he result of am eter reading (hence Watson'sa ttitudet ot he role of introspective reporti np erception; see Watson, 1913 , where the argument is developed in detail).
What place could the notions of thoughto rt hinking, notions defined in terms of introspection, have in ap sychological scheme of this sort? The answer,o fc ourse, is none -w ithout introspection, to quoteW atson'sp araphrase of Titchener 'the behaviourist ::: does not know therei sa ny such thing as thinking'.A ll he acknowledgesi st hat organisms behave, that muscles contract and glandss ecrete. Such 'responses', as Watson called them, can be categorized as being either 'hereditary' or 'habits' (Watson, 1919) . (As he explained in the paper reproduced here, the term 'habit' is not used to mean afi xed chain of responses; it simplym eans patterns of behaviour that are acquired,orare not 'hereditary'). Both types of responseoccur both in explicit( readily observable) and implicit forms. Examples of explicith ereditary responses ares neezing, blinking, and so on; implicit hereditaryr esponses include the whole system of endocrine secretions,f or which instrumentation is necessaryf or observationstobemade. Explicit habit responses include 'tennisplaying, violin playing, building houses, talking easily to people ::: ' ( Watson, 1919,p.14) .
What remains is the fourth category: implicit habit responses. The assumption here is that when aman is observeddoingnothing (e.g.sitting with abook in front of him), appropriate instrumentation could reveal responses of the same general type as those involved in playing tennis (or reading aloud fort hat matter), just as instrumentation could reveal the occurrence of endocrine secretioni ns uch ap erson. Fromt his perspective, to say that thinking consists of subvocal laryngeal activity, is to getholdof the wrong end of the stick. Better fort he behaviourist to sayt hat this collection of difficult-to-observe behavioursequates to what others, of adifferent philosophicalbent, like to call thinking. Watson assumed(and subsequent experimental studies confirmed) that subvocallaryngeal activitywould be one of these behaviours, but he wasclear in his view that this was just one component of 'thinking', and not an essential one. Thinking is, quite evidently,possible forpeople whohave had the larynx surgically removed; but in these cases much of the neuromusculars ystem necessary for' implicith abit responses' will remain. 'Todestroy enoughofthe sensorymotor mechanisms to make language organization and hence thought impossible would in all probability bring aboutthe death of the patient' (Watson, 1919, p. 316) .
The thought-experiment implied by this last remark raises the question of what would be the case if an intervention were possible that prevented all effector activitybut allowed the central nervous system to carry on doingits stuff. Iimagine that most of us (Watson included) would accept that thinking would still be possible; it would be just that the 'implicit' motor responsesw ould be blocked so that even sophisticated instrumentation could not detect them. The 21st centurya ssumption, that thinking consists of neural activity,would be allowed, but Watson would perhaps be satisfied by the implied conclusion that thinking consists of doing something.
And yet Iwonder.Aperson stripped of all effector systems would missalot (toput it mildly). The isolated 'brain in av at' (tou se Dennett's, 1991, phrasef or this classic thought-experiment), even if it were supplied with an input down the auditorynerve to set it aproblem to think about, might findthe task difficultinthe absence of an effector system.Effector activity produces feedback that may play acritical role in the activity we call thinking -wecan detect what we say (even if we only mumble it to ourselves) and the feedback produced is likely to be influentiali nd etermining the next patterno f activityweemit. To this extent the peripheralist view of Watson that 'our whole body does the thinking' contains what may be an important truth.
